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Abstract
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a fast-spreading viral infection that can produce large and
costly outbreaks in livestock populations. Transmission occurs at multiple spatial scales, as
can the actions used to control outbreaks. The U.S. cattle industry is spatially expansive,
with heterogeneous distributions of animals and infrastructure. We have developed a model
that incorporates the e↵ects of scale for both disease transmission and control actions, applied
here in simulating FMD outbreaks in U.S. cattle. We simulated infection initiating in each
of the 3049 counties in the contiguous U.S., 100 times per county. Depending on where
initial infection was located, specific regions were more likely to produce large outbreaks,
driven by infrastructure and other demographic attributes such as premises clustering and
number of cattle on premises. Sensitivity analyses suggest these attributes had more impact
on outbreak metrics than the ranges of estimated disease parameter values. Additionally,
although shipping accounted for a small percentage of overall transmission, areas receiving
the most animal shipments tended to have other attributes that increase the probability
of large outbreaks. These results demonstrate the importance of accounting for spatial
and demographic heterogeneity when modelling potential outbreak trajectories and possible
control actions.
Keywords: simulation, geographic scale, sensitivity analysis, vaccination, culling,
movement bans
1. Introduction1
A fast-spreading disease such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) could potentially have2
significant economic impacts on the United States (U.S.) livestock industry. The FMD out-3
break in the United Kingdom in 2001 was estimated to have cost £3.1 billion to agriculture,4
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including losses in export value, with similar losses to tourism and business of £2.7 - 3.25
billion [1]. Estimating potential FMD impacts on the U.S. livestock industry requires an es-6
timate of the number of premises impacted and control measures that would be undertaken7
under di↵erent scenarios. An outbreak could predominantly a↵ect one livestock type, as in8
the 2001 outbreak in Argentina a↵ecting only cattle [2], or multiple livestock types, as in the9
United Kingdom [3]. Since there has not been an FMD outbreak in the U.S. since the early10
1900s [4], we must rely on simulated outbreaks, which can be informed by empirical data11
from outbreaks in other countries, to estimate the relative impacts of contributing factors12
and control strategies in an outbreak. Here we address a cattle-only scenario, but this lays13
the groundwork to include other livestock types as well.14
Past outbreaks of FMD in non-endemic countries provide invaluable data for countries15
that have not had recent outbreaks. Factors at a range of spatial scales can influence the16
outbreak trajectory [3, 5, 6]. FMD can spread through direct transmission between animals,17
or indirectly via fomites, both forms of which are more likely to occur over shorter distances.18
Studies of previous outbreaks suggest that most FMD transmission occurs within localised19
areas [3, 7]. Additionally, premises spatial distributions can a↵ect predicted outbreak charac-20
teristics, including outbreak size [8]. Although most transmission events in an FMD outbreak21
occur at local scales, larger scale transmission (e.g. via animal shipments) has been impor-22
tant in moving infection to new foci and setting o↵ new chains of local transmission [3, 5].23
Simultaneously capturing multiple scales of transmission is therefore an important aspect of24
FMD simulations.25
The most commonly used control actions (culling or vaccination of animals, and shipment26
restrictions) in FMD outbreaks are applied according to the implemented control policy and27
the landscape and demographics of the infected area [3, 5, 6, 9]. Vaccination usually occurs on28
premises not thought to be infected, either in proximity to an infected premises or identified29
to be at risk and part of a vaccination area. Examples of this type of regional vaccination30
include vaccinating the hardest hit areas of an outbreak to stem the spread, as was done31
in Miyazaki, Japan in 2010 [6], or mass vaccination campaigns that target all animals in a32
country or part of a country, as was done in the 2001 Argentina outbreak [2].33
E↵ective shipment bans can help to contain outbreaks from spreading to uninfected areas34
of a country and can therefore influence the geographic extent of an outbreak. Countries35
experiencing outbreaks have also implemented shipment restrictions on or around reported36
infected premises [2, 6]. Additional restrictions may apply to all livestock shipments in a37
region or nation [2, 3, 5]. These control actions are inherently a↵ected by the spatial and38
demographic characteristics of the population to which they are applied.39
The U.S. cattle industry has a number of distinguishing attributes compared to cattle40
industries in countries that have had recent FMD outbreaks. It is larger, both spatially and41
in animal and premises numbers. Additionally, there are distinct regional concentrations42
of infrastructure and production practices that vary due to complex economic and resource43
availability - for example, high concentrations of feedlots and finishing operations near grain44
production areas [10, 11]. Although these regions may be spread out over large areas,45
they are also well-connected through networks of animal shipments [10, 12]. Given these46
characteristics of the U.S. cattle industry, simulations accounting for premises density, spatial47
relationships, production practices, and shipment patterns will be suited to understand the48
conditions that increase the probability of large outbreaks in this population.49
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Our previous [13] FMD simulation incorporated U.S.-specific animal shipment patterns50
and infrastructure, and the impact of di↵erent scales of animal shipment controls. However,51
due to limited premises location information, the data were aggregated to the county level,52
and county-to-county transmission was simulated, tracking which counties contained one or53
more infectious premises. This enhanced version of the U.S. Disease Outbreak Simulation54
(USDOS) expands on our previous model by increasing the granularity of simulations to55
the premises level, using a combination of generated premises locations [14] and a shortcut56
computational technique [15]. We then infer outcomes at larger geographic scales.57
USDOS is a tool that can be customised to simulate a variety of scenarios according58
to available data and parameter information. We simulated cattle-only outbreak scenarios,59
with and without control options [16], and performed sensitivity analyses to identify the60
variables that played the strongest roles in driving the model outputs. Understanding what61
drives outbreak outcomes will be key to e ciently focusing data collection and validation62
e↵orts in areas that provide the most information value.63
2. Methods64
2.1. Model structure65
We developed a stochastic disease spread model that included several control options66
and constraints on control resources. Cattle premises were the most granular unit. Premises67
attributes included location, production type (dairy or beef) and estimated numbers of cattle68
on each premises (see Sections 2.3 & S1.1 for details).69
Disease spread among premises occurred through two possible routes in this model: ship-70
ments of infectious animals and local transmission. Local transmission is distance-dependent71
and collectively represents multiple factors that may transmit infection from one premises72
to another, such as wind, or movement of equipment, feed, or other fomites.73
Each premises had a disease status and a control status that was tracked throughout74
each simulation. The disease status reflected the course of infection. The sequence of disease75
statuses was: “susceptible”, “exposed” (pathogen incubation and pre-infectious period),76
“infectious” (when the pathogen can be transmitted to other premises), and “immune” (no77
transmission and no further exposure).78
The control status reflected what was known about that premises and control actions79
taken. Each premises began with status “not reported”, indicating no reporting or control80
measures. They could then be identified as either “reported” (from identification of infection81
until control is implemented) or as a “dangerous contact”. Dangerous contacts (DC) are82
premises which are at higher risk of infection, for example, due to known contact with an83
infected premises. DC premises could then either become “reported” if infected any time84
prior to control, or could start the sequence of control application statuses: “implemented”85
(control applied but not yet e↵ective) and “e↵ective” (transmission reduced according to the86
e↵ectiveness of control). The disease and control statuses progressed independently, other87
than a reporting lag time after becoming “exposed” to becoming “reported”. We assumed88
that a DC would be under surveillance and would therefore have a faster reporting time than89
premises not identified as DC (Table 2). The premises where infection was seeded had its90
own “index case reporting time”. Each of these statuses was assigned a duration until the91
next status in the sequence (Tables 1 & 2).92
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All model assumptions and parameter values were informed by published literature, his-93
toric outbreak data from other countries, or consultation with subject matter experts.94
We simulated combinations of three potential FMD control mechanisms: shipment bans,95
culls, and vaccination [16]. Culls and vaccination were applied to premises with specific96
statuses or criteria:97
• IP refers to premises that have a disease status of “infectious” and a control status of98
“reported”99
• 3 km ring and 10 km ring refers to premises located within a control zone within a100
three or ten kilometre radius of a given IP101
• DC refers to premises that have been identified as “dangerous contacts” for a given IP.102
Each outbreak simulation began with all premises susceptible, except for one randomly103
selected seed premises designated as exposed. Time steps were modelled as discrete days.104
Each day, all premises statuses were first updated based on the previous day’s events, then105
all events for disease progression, control actions, and local and shipment-based transmission106
were determined in that order, going into e↵ect the following day.107
Control actions were triggered by new reports of infected premises. Control resource108
constraints were updated as they were used to ensure resources were not overdrawn. If109
constraints were limiting, premises were treated as resources allowed, in the order in which110
they were identified for control.111
Simulations continued until one of the following occurred: the outbreak died out (no112
exposed or infectious premises remained) or 365 simulated days passed, whichever happened113
earliest.114
The code was written in C++11, available in C++ or as an R package on115
https://webblabb.github.io/usammusdos/index.html [17].116
2.2. Scenarios simulated117
Based on di↵erent combinations of the three control actions, we simulated five main118
control scenarios, each with varying levels of e↵ectiveness (see Section 2.6 and Table 2).119
These scenarios should not be interpreted as policy, but allowed us to identify patterns120
in outputs and are based on strategies that have been used in FMD outbreak situations121
[3, 6, 18, 19]. The scenarios were:122
• IP cull scenario: Culling of reported premises and a state-level shipment ban123
• IP & DC cull scenario: Culling of both reported premises and dangerous contact124
premises and a state-level shipment ban125
• IP cull & DC vaccination scenario: Culling of reported premises and the vaccination126
of dangerous contact premises and a state-level shipment ban127
• IP cull & 3km ring vaccination scenario: Culling of reported premises and vaccination128
in a 3km ring around the IP and a state-level shipment ban129
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• IP cull & 10km ring vaccination scenario: Culling of reported premises and vaccination130
in a 10km ring around the IP and a state-level shipment ban131
Additionally, we had a scenario without control implemented, hereafter referred to as the132
“base” scenario. We also ran a “no shipments” scenario, with no control and with shipments133
inactivated, such that the only transmission was from local spread.134
2.3. Premises locations and sizes135
The precise locations and holdings of livestock premises in the U.S. are not publicly136
accessible. We therefore used outputs from the Farm Location and Animal Production137
Simulator (FLAPS) [14], which generates locations for premises based on environmental138
factors associated with the likelihood of livestock premises location, and numbers of premises139
per county, as well as livestock populations on each of the premises [20]. We adjusted the140
FLAPS outputs to generate maximum and minimum population estimates, accounting for141
calves and the seasonal changes in the U.S. cattle population (details in Section S1.1).142
In order to capture the variation inherent in the generated premises locations and popula-143
tion assignments, we used multiple FLAPS realisations of cattle demographics. Preliminary144
analyses indicated that ten realisations of simulated output su ciently captured the ob-145
served range of variability. For each demographic file and scenario, we seeded infection in146
each county in the contiguous U.S. at a random premises within the county 10 times for each147
of the 10 FLAPS realisations, resulting in 100 simulations per seed county or 304,900 total148
simulations per population estimate (max or min) and scenario.149
2.4. Local disease transmission150
The probability of transmission from infectious premises i to susceptible premises j is:151
1  exp ( achibchjD(dij)) (1)
where hi and hj are the herd sizes for the infectious and susceptible premises, respectively,152
and ac and bc are cattle-specific transmissibility and susceptibility parameters, respectively153
(Table 1). Although animal type-specific parameters can be inputted, in this case we used154
the same values for all cattle (dairy and beef) based on data availability. D is the distance-155
dependent component where d is distance between i and j.156
The distance-dependent component, D(di,j), is defined as a spatial kernel:
D(di,j) =
k1
1 +
⇣
d
k2
⌘k3 (2)
where d is the shortest linear distance between i and j, k2 is the scale parameter, and k3 is157
the shape parameter. The parameter k1 is the normalising constant that scales the function158
so that the following holds true:159
Z 1
0
2⇡rD(r)dr = 1 (3)
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where r is equivalent to d, the distance between premises, in the spatial kernel equation. The160
power-law kernel function (Equation 2) we used to capture local transmission dynamics was161
used previously in the metapopulation version of this USDOS model [13] and has been fit162
to several FMD outbreak data sets [3, 21]. The transmission rate is high and fairly constant163
over short distances, and then decays into a longer-distance tail; this shape is consistent164
with distance-decay of local, density-dependent transmission [3, 13]. Normalising the kernel165
function distributes the impact of the transmission rate by summing the kernel volume to166
one (Equation 3).167
The transmissibility and kernel function parameters were fit to FMD outbreak data and168
to published kernel functions using maximum likelihood estimation; the default parameters169
were estimated by fitting to the UK 2001 FMD outbreak in units of metres (Table 1). The170
default kernel parameters were validated by running simulations with the Warwick model,171
an established FMD model that was developed for the UK [3, 18]. With those parameters172
and 2001 conditions, the Warwick model produced outbreaks with a mean of 1600 IPs173
(range: 1000-2800) which is approximately 80% (range: 50%-150%) of the total number of174
IPs observed in the 2001 outbreak.175
Table 1: Transmission Parameters
Parameter Default Value Range Reference
Cattle transmission rate (ac) 10.252 3.6–100 see Section
Cattle susceptibility (bc) 1 N/A 2.4
Normalising constant (k1) 1.46e 08 4.07e 10–3.91e 08
Scale parameter for spatial kernel (k2) 1686.16 1686.16–5414.72
Shape parameter for spatial kernel (k3) 2.267 2.022–3.006
Latency period 5 days 3–13 days [13, 22, 23]
Infectiousness period 7 days 5–20 days [13, 22, 23]
2.5. Disease transmission from animal shipments176
Shipment-based disease spread is based on output from the United States Animal Move-177
ment Model (USAMM) [12]. Using a validated model is necessary as there is no complete178
record of cattle shipments available for the U.S. Informed by interstate certificates of vet-179
erinary inspection (ICVIs) and current and historic census data, USAMM stochastically180
simulates production-type specific (beef or dairy) shipments between U.S. counties. Param-181
eters are estimated in a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) framework [12] and182
describe state-specific distance-dependence and annual number of shipments. Annual prob-183
abilities of shipments between counties were divided by 365 to calculate daily probabilities.184
For each shipment, premises of the appropriate production type and county were chosen185
randomly as sender and receiver.186
In USDOS, shipments for each simulation replicate were predicted based on a random187
draw from the posterior distribution of USAMM. For computational speed, we only gen-188
erated shipments originating from exposed or infectious premises and assumed all of these189
contained exposed or infectious animals, respectively. We assumed that shipments originat-190
ing from an infectious premises caused the receiver to become infectious on the following191
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day, bypassing the latency period of the infection. Similarly, receiving exposed shipments192
meant the receiving premises became infectious at the same time as the sending premises.193
2.6. Control action details194
2.6.1. Shipments195
Shipment bans simulated state-wide restrictions on livestock shipments, which are trig-196
gered by the first reported premises in a state. All simulated control scenarios included197
shipment bans at the state level, meaning once a ban was in e↵ect for a given state, all198
shipments from premises within that state were reduced to the designated e↵ectiveness level199
(Table 2).200
2.6.2. Culling201
We assumed the e↵ectiveness of culls at reducing transmission was 100%. To impose202
data-based constraints on carcass disposal, we assumed a disposal mechanism at burial sites203
with the proper facilities and space for handling them. Using the Environmental Protection204
Agency’s (EPA) landfill databases [24] and assumptions about capacity and carcass space205
requirements (Table 2) we estimated the total burial capacity for each state in the contiguous206
U.S., ranging from 1.3 to 2.8 billion cattle carcasses nationally. Carcasses could only be207
disposed of in the same state as the premises. Once that state’s landfills were full in a given208
simulation, no additional animals could be culled in that state.209
We also incorporated constraints on carcass transportation into the culling rate, which210
was estimated (Table 2) based on estimates of truck capacity and loading time. Additional211
details on calculations for landfill capacity and carcass transportation can be found in the212
supplement (Section S1.3.1).213
2.6.3. Vaccination214
We assumed only high-potency outbreak response vaccine with high e↵ectiveness would215
be used and that only one dose would be given (Table 2). Vaccination rate was based on216
bovine tuberculosis testing times (Table 2) (see Section S1.3.2 for details). We assumed217
an estimated 300,000 doses of vaccine would be available 7 days after ordering, then an218
additional 500,000 doses would be available every 7 days, up to the maximum number of 2.5219
million vaccine doses (Table 2) [25].220
2.7. Control parameters221
Control parameter default values and ranges are detailed in Table 2.222
We assumed that reporting always occurred after animals became symptomatic and in-223
fectious. Although the disease status of potential dangerous contacts would be unknown at224
the time of investigation, we assumed there would be di↵erent probabilities of identifying225
actually-exposed versus non-exposed premises as dangerous contacts, implemented as scal-226
ing factors for the probability of transmission. This scaled probability, referred to as DC227
detectability, was evaluated stochastically to determine which premises were identified as228
dangerous contacts for each reported premises. The values in Table 2 were derived to match229
observed average numbers of dangerous contacts per reported premises from the 2001 UK230
FMD outbreak [18, 38].231
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Table 2: Control Parameters
Parameter Default Value Range Reference
Index case reporting time 15 days 2–31 days [26]
Non-index reporting time 8 days 5–25 days UK outbreak
data
DC reporting time 2 days 1–5 days UK outbreak
data
Susceptible DC detectability 4 0–6 see text
Exposed DC detectability 5 1.19 –8
Per carcass space
requirements
1.96m3 1.2  2.6m3 [27, 28, 29,
30, 31]
Culling rate 240
cattle/prem/day
72-720
cattle/prem/day
see text
Culling e↵ectiveness 100% N/A see text
Vaccination rate 6804
cattle/prem/day
600-18000
cattle/prem/day
see text
Vaccine doses per animal 1 N/A [32, 35]
Time to vaccine protection 11 days 4–14 days [33, 35, 34, 25]
Vaccine e↵ectiveness 90% 50–95% [35, 36]
Duration of immunity 183 days N/A [35, 37]
Vaccine availability day 1-6 0 doses N/A [25]
Vaccine availability day 7-13 300,000 doses N/A [25]
Vaccine availability day
14-max doses
500,000
doses/week
N/A [25]
Max vaccine doses 2.5 million doses N/A [25]
Shipment ban e↵ectiveness 90% & 75% 75% –95% [18]
We used information from non-endemic FMD countries that have had outbreaks to pa-232
rameterise the range of index case reporting times [26] and the UK 2001 FMD outbreak233
to parameterise the default index case reporting time and non-index reporting times. The234
median number of days from when a premises was exposed to when it was reported was 8235
days in the UK outbreak and 15 days for the index case. The DC reporting time is also236
informed by the UK outbreak; however, because DCs were often culled before they were237
reported, there is less data available on the DC reporting time parameter.238
2.8. Sensitivity analyses239
Sensitivity analyses were run to quantify the impact of the model inputs on outputs240
(outbreak metrics), separately for disease transmission and for control-related parameters.241
To keep computational time manageable, a sample of counties was selected based on premises242
density, number of in-shipments, number of out-shipments, and premises clustering values243
(see Section S1.4 for details). For each of these criteria, we ensured that areas across the244
U.S. were represented. There were 78 counties selected from the stratified random sampling245
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and eight counties added either (1) to add to the geographic range or (2) from a list of six246
counties that were used for sensitivity in the county-level model [13]. We include these six247
counties for comparison and because of their importance in the cattle industry (Figure S1 &248
Table S1). Both sensitivity analyses used the same subset of counties.249
Parameter sets for the sensitivity analyses were determined using Latin Hypercube (LHC)250
Sampling, selecting 100 values across the ranges of all parameters. The parameters included251
in the disease transmission sensitivity analysis were: transmission rate (a), kernel parameters252
(k2, k3) and the latency and infectious periods (Table 1). The parameters included in the253
control sensitivity analysis were: index case reporting time, reporting time, DC reporting254
time, susceptible DC detectability, exposed DC detectability, culling rate, vaccination rate,255
time to vaccine protection, vaccine e↵ectiveness, and shipment ban e↵ectiveness (Table 2).256
Separately from LHC sampling, the lowest, default, and highest carcass space requirement257
parameter values were used to calculate three possible disposal site capacity data sets. Pa-258
rameter ranges were chosen based on literature values, credible intervals from our analyses,259
values from the county-level FMD transmission model [13] for comparability, and standard260
recommendations for sensitivity analysis when parameter values are unknown.261
The transmission sensitivity analysis used only the base scenario, which excluded any262
e↵ects of control strategies on the results. The control sensitivity analyses used the IP & DC263
cull scenario and the IP cull & DC vaccination scenario. We selected these to compare a cull-264
only scenario with a cull-and-vaccinate scenario while maintaining maximum comparability265
for other variables.266
For the transmission parameter sensitivity analysis, each of the 100 parameter sets were267
used to run 100 simulations (10 replicates of each of the 10 minimum FLAPS files) or 10,000268
simulations for each of the 86 selected seed counties, for a total of 860,000 simulations.269
The control parameter sensitivity analysis required increasing the number of simulations to270
30,000 (300 sets of parameters) for each of the 86 seed counties in order to include the three271
landfill data sets with di↵erent capacities. The total number of control parameter sensitivity272
simulations was 2.58 million per control scenario.273
2.9. Output metrics274
All results are aggregated to the county level to facilitate interpretation across locations275
and realisations. All analyses of the simulation outputs were performed using custom code276
in R version 3.5.0-3.5.3. [39]277
Simulation results were quantified using the following outbreak metrics:278
• Number of infected premises: the total number (nationally) of infected and reported279
premises280
• Number of cattle infected: the total number (nationally) of cattle on infected and281
reported premises282
• Number of infected counties: the total number of counties infected when infection is283
seeded in that county, also known as “epidemic extent” [13].284
• County risk: the proportion of simulations in which a county is infected, not including285
the simulations in which infection was seeded in that county.286
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• Duration: the number of days between the initial seed infection until there are no287
longer infected premises, or 365 days, whichever happens earlier288
• Proportion local transmission: The proportion of non-shipment transmission events at289
the county-level, relative to all transmission events290
• Outbreak take-o↵ (for sensitivity analyses): the probability that >5000 premises will291
become infected, chosen as a natural breakpoint in the distribution292
• Outbreak fade-out (for sensitivity analyses): the probability that>1 and<5000 premises293
will become infected, and duration will be shorter than 365 days294
Each outbreak metric was calculated for both the median and the upper 97.5 percentile295
for each county over the 304,900 simulations. Because outbreak metrics are bi-modal in that296
outbreaks either take o↵ or they do not, we used the median to show results for the majority297
of simulations and the upper 97.5% for outbreaks that do take-o↵.298
For the sensitivity analyses, partial-rank correlation coe cients (PRCC) between the299
outbreak metrics and the model attributes (both parameters and demographic characteris-300
tics) were used to estimate the e↵ect and relative importance of each attribute [40]. Prior301
to running the PRCC analysis, we checked the relationships between model attributes and302
outbreak metrics to ensure monotonicity assumptions were met. For disease transmission303
sensitivity analysis, in addition to the parameters included in the LHC sampling process304
(Section 2.8), we also the following included demographic attributes: county-level premises305
density, premises clustering, in-shipment volume, out-shipment volume, and seed premises306
size. For control sensitivity, we included the same demographic attributes as in the trans-307
mission sensitivity analysis and the control parameters described in Section 2.8. The PRCC308
estimates the e↵ect of individual model attributes on outbreak metrics, but we are also inter-309
ested in the interactions between attributes [13]. To explore the e↵ect of these interactions,310
we estimated sensitivities from regression coe cients. We checked the results from regres-311
sions without interaction terms to ensure that the regression and the PRCC were giving312
similar results, since the former includes an assumption of linearity. We then proceeded with313
the regression analyses that included the interaction terms between model attributes.314
In order to determine the drivers of outbreaks that take-o↵ and become large, we used315
PRCC between outbreak metrics and model attributes on the subset of simulations with316
large outbreaks. For this analysis, we used the number of infected premises and counties and317
the outbreak duration as the outbreak metrics and used the same model attributes for the318
respective sensitivity analyses (disease transmission, culling scenario or vaccination scenario)319
as we did for the PRCC analyses looking at all outbreaks. Outbreaks were considered large320
if they were greater than 5,000 premises, reached more than 500 counties and lasted more321
than 100 days.322
3. Results323
3.1. Sensitivity analyses324
In the PRCC analyses, the attributes that were consistently important across outbreak325
metrics, in both transmission and control sensitivity analyses, related to the demographics of326
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where the initial infection was seeded. Of particular importance was the seed premises size327
(Figures S2-S4). In the disease transmission sensitivity analysis with no mitigation applied,328
outbreak duration was also driven by infectious and latent periods, predictably. Additionally,329
transmission rate has a stronger e↵ect on number of premises infected and probability of an330
outbreak larger than 5,000 premises than for other outbreak metrics (Figure S2). For both331
the control scenarios for which we performed sensitivity analyses, infrastructure attributes332
dominated and far fewer parameters impacted the outputs (Figures S3 & S4).333
Similarly, in the regression analyses, the attributes with the most impact on model out-334
puts are related to infrastructure and demographics of where initial infection was seeded335
(Figure 1). With the interactions included, some demographic attributes became more im-336
portant than they were in the PRCC analysis. In-shipments, premises clustering, premises337
density, and seed premises size had fairly consistent e↵ects in direction and magnitude on338
outbreak metrics in the regression analyses (Figures 1 & S5). However, the R2 values for339
the regression models are low, so the results from them should be taken with caution (Table340
S3).341
In addition to the infrastructure attributes and model parameters which were important342
in both PRCC and the regression, some of the interaction terms in the regression had a343
strong e↵ect on the outbreak metrics. For example, the interaction between in-shipments344
and premises clustering consistently had one of the largest proportional e↵ect sizes (Figures345
1-2, & S5-S7). In both control sensitivity analyses, the few parameters (non-demographic346
or infrastructure) that impacted the outputs were reporting times for infected premises and347
detectability of dangerous contacts (Figures 2, S6, & S7). Rates of control application and348
e↵ectiveness were estimated by both the PRCC and regression to have less impact than these349
factors under the conditions and ranges we tested.350
The results from the PRCC sensitivity analyses on only large outbreaks showed increasing351
importance of model parameters, while demographic and infrastructure attributes decreased352
for both disease transmission and control sensitivity (Figures S8-S10). Specifically, for disease353
transmission sensitivity, latent period duration, transmission rate (a), and kernel shape354
parameter (k3) were consistently important for the outbreak metrics. The culling scenario355
sensitivity was unique because one of the infrastructure attributes, landfills, was by far356
the most important and this attribute also showed a marked increase from the sensitivity357
that included all outbreaks. Additionally, reporting time, susceptible DC identification, and358
cull rate showed an increase in importance. The vaccination sensitivity results also showed359
reporting time, susceptible DC identification, vaccination rate and delay to e↵ectiveness, and360
cull rate to be the most important attributes.361
3.2. Relationship to county attributes362
Given the strong e↵ects of associations with in-shipments and premises clustering, the363
geographic distributions of these attributes (Figure 3) were consistent with larger numbers of364
infected premises, counties, and animals, regardless of whether or not mitigation was applied.365
Where levels of both in-shipments and premises clustering are high, large outbreaks were366
generated more frequently. Additionally, simulations seeded in counties with many large367
premises (1000 or more animals) (Figure 3e) were more likely to be seeded in one of these368
large premises, which strongly a↵ected the probability of large outbreaks where these counties369
were located, in the western half of the country. Premises density is generally higher, and370
11
with fewer animals on premises, in the eastern half of the country where outbreaks tend to371
be smaller. However, regions such as central Florida, where both in-shipments and premises372
density are high tended to have large outbreaks more frequently.373
3.3. Shipping vs. local spread374
Comparing animal shipments and local transmission across scenarios, local transmission375
tended to dominate (Figure 4a). As expected, when shipment bans were in e↵ect, the376
proportion of local transmission increased (Figures 4b, 4c & S11). This was not an absolute377
increase in local transmission, as is evident when comparing overall outbreak sizes with and378
without shipments (Figure 5), but only reflects the proportional decrease in shipment-driven379
transmission, scaling with the e↵ectiveness of the shipment ban. Also as expected, regions380
with high shipment activity (Figures 3a & 3c) showed the most change in these proportions.381
Results from the “no shipment” scenario (no controls, local transmission only) suggest382
that while shipments increase outbreak sizes (Figures 5 & S12), the lack of shipments is not383
enough to prevent large outbreaks from occurring (Figure S13b & S13f).384
3.4. National scale outbreak sizes385
Among the scenarios simulated, not including sensitivity analyses, the vast majority386
(96%) of the 3.66 million simulations resulted in a total of fewer than ten cattle premises387
becoming infected. 91% of those simulations (3.24 million) did not spread beyond the single388
initial index infection (Figure 5).389
3.5. Regionally consistent patterns for outbreak metrics390
The very largest outbreaks (based on infected premises counts) occurred when the initial391
infection was located in specific counties, many of which are concentrated in the west, the392
Great Plains, and central Florida (Figures 6b & S13c-S13f). Even for these counties that393
more frequently produced large outbreaks, the median simulation result for most was that394
infection did not spread beyond the single initial index infection (Figures 6a, S13a & S13b).395
The regions adjacent to the areas identified above tended to have the next-highest prob-396
ability of producing large outbreaks (Figures 6 & S13). These regional patterns tended to397
be fairly consistent across a variety of scenarios, with areas that produced large outbreaks398
expanding and contracting over the same core regions as conditions varied (Figures 6 & S13).399
The other outbreak metrics showed similar regional patterns, including number of counties400
and cattle infected, duration, and county risk (Figures S14, S15, S16, S17).401
3.6. E↵ects of control strategies402
Control strategies that targeted uninfected premises (either by DC or proximity), reduced403
outbreaks across all measured metrics better than IP culling alone (Figures 5 & S12). Strate-404
gies targeting dangerous contacts tended to be more e cient than the proximity-based ring405
strategies at reducing outbreak size metrics (Figures 5 & S12). This pattern was consistent406
regardless of whether the identified dangerous contacts are culled or vaccinated. However,407
the outbreak duration metric was similar between DC and ring-based strategies (Figures408
S12d & S12h).409
In scenarios with large outbreaks, over 20 million cattle were targeted for control within410
a simulation (Figures S12c, S12g). Based on our assumptions about vaccine production,411
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capped at 2.5 million doses available incrementally over 6 weeks (Table 2), limited resource412
availability clearly constrained the overall impacts of vaccination scenarios. Although the es-413
timated national total disposal capacity far exceeded this number of animals, the restriction414
on sending animals to disposal sites only within the same state created regional constraints.415
These control scenarios showed similar bi-modal behaviour to the base scenarios; some sim-416
ulations still reached large outbreak sizes, though partially mitigated by control actions.417
But the majority of the control simulations also tended not to spread beyond ten premises418
(Figures 5 & S18).419
4. Discussion420
A previous study from this group that simulated FMD transmission at the county-level421
[13] identified higher probabilities for large outbreaks in areas that closely coincide with422
areas of high premises density (Figure 3d). While the county-level model could account423
for shipments and total premises-per-county density, it could not capture premises cluster-424
ing without premises locations, so premises were treated as randomly located within each425
county. Since the original metapopulation study was published, cattle premises locations in426
the U.S. have been estimated by the FLAPS project [14] enabling the finer scale geographic427
data used in this study. This higher-resolution premises data is the primary di↵erence be-428
tween these two studies, and is also the reason for the di↵erence in regions identified as429
important. The sensitivity analyses showed that infrastructure characteristics consistently430
had the strongest impacts on simulated outbreaks, and that these attributes, such as cluster-431
ing and in-shipments identified in the interaction sensitivity analysis, can be used to identify432
regions of interest.433
With shipments factoring significantly in the sensitivity analyses, but playing a small role434
relative to local transmission (Figure 4), there is a distinct di↵erence between shipments as435
a transmission mechanism, and as a county-level infrastructure attribute. In terms of mech-436
anism, out-shipments from infected premises did move infectious animals into new areas437
that then increased outbreak size by local transmission. But as an attribute, the sensitivity438
analyses indicated that infection starting in counties with many in-shipments was associ-439
ated with increased outbreak size, and starting in counties with many out-shipments was440
associated with decreased size, even though out-shipments excluded shipments to slaughter.441
The strong e↵ect of shipments in the sensitivity analyses are thus not because in-shipment442
is the explanatory mechanism for spread, but rather indicates infrastructure that promotes443
the spread of infection.444
These patterns of animal shipments driving longer distance transmission events and new445
disease foci are consistent with the idea of extreme value theory in statistics. In extreme446
value theory, the extreme tails of a distribution, such as the distance over which transmission447
occurs, are modelled using di↵erent covariates or a di↵erent structure than the bulk of the448
distribution, because the drivers of extreme events are di↵erent than those that are nor-449
mally observed. Here, we take an extreme value perspective by using shipment information450
to capture extreme transmission events and are able to show that this changes prediction451
from using only a local spread kernel. Even using local spread kernels that incorporate452
transmission at longer distances produce di↵erent results from using a shorter-distance local453
spread kernel plus shipments to represent longer distance shipments (unpublished results).454
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Transmission at long distance is sometimes represented statistically by using an additional455
fitted term that captures long distance transmission separately [7]. This approach is often456
successful in capturing many general characteristics of long distance shipments, but can still457
fail at predicting specific space and time locations of transmission. Using specific information458
like shipments (or other covariates) that narrow possible space and time locations for ex-459
treme events like long-distance transmission generally improve the specificity of predictions460
as shown in this study.461
The vast majority of simulations with this set of parameters and assumptions did not462
result in large outbreaks. However, other modelling choices we made, not represented in the463
sensitivity analyses, may a↵ect outbreak frequency and size. The premises used in the simu-464
lations only represented cattle operations, not other susceptible livestock or wildlife. While465
FMD outbreaks only involving cattle have occurred in other countries [2], adding other466
animal types to the simulations may result in di↵erent outbreak frequencies and spatial dis-467
tributions. By using the same parameters and functional form for non-shipment transmission468
among dairy and beef cattle, we e↵ectively assumed that distance, herd size, and the param-469
eter values interact in ways that produce the same probability of spread among these cattle470
types. Control actions may also have di↵erent resource availability, e↵ectiveness rates, im-471
plementation rates, or other di↵erences from the scenarios we explored. Generating outputs472
to address most of these changes is simply a matter of specifying the inputs. We suggest the473
most value lies not in interpreting the outbreak metrics literally, but in comparing relative474
e↵ects addressed in the sensitivity analyses.475
The largest outbreaks tended to be specific to regions concentrated in the western half476
of the U.S., and the consistent geographic patterns observed at the national level are driven477
by these regions. Although disease transmission was simulated at the premises-level, these478
consistent geographic patterns can largely be explained by county-level measures of infras-479
tructure and demographic attributes—many shipments, premises clustering, density, and480
large premises with over 1,000 head. The sensitivity analyses also indicated the relative im-481
portance of these attributes over most parameter values. Premises and county scales in this482
context are not completely independent; the simulation of shipments to and from premises,483
as well as the estimated premises locations, are based in part on county-level observations.484
However, knowing which premises contain over 1,000 head and measuring premises clustering485
does requires premises-level information.486
Comparing the sensitivity between all simulations and just those that take o↵ suggests487
that a combination of county-level and premises-level attributes were influential in an out-488
break taking o↵. Once take-o↵ occurs, the model parameters further influence outbreak size.489
Consequently, the accuracy of parameter values may be of less importance for identifying490
areas that may lead to large outbreaks and there may be more information value in ensuring491
that county attributes describing shipments and demography are accurately measured.492
Control strategy results should not be interpreted as policy recommendations, but tools to493
identify areas for additional exploration and data collection, and to understand under what494
conditions resources may become constrained. Under these assumptions and parameters,495
targeting control actions to only reported premises (IP culling scenario) has less e↵ect than496
control scenarios that also target uninfected or unreported premises (DC and ring scenarios).497
This pattern of combining control actions to more e↵ectively reduce outbreak metrics has also498
been seen in other studies looking at potential FMD outbreaks in other areas [18, 19, 41, 42].499
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Scenarios that tended to be e↵ective at reducing outbreak size were not necessarily as500
e↵ective at reducing duration. Specifically, the IP cull & 10km ring vaccination scenario501
performed as well as, or better than, the DC scenarios at reducing duration. This outcome,502
in which the strategy that most reduces size may not reduce duration as e ciently, has been503
seen in previous studies that looked at IP & DC culling and IP culling & ring vaccination504
in other locations [41, 42].505
In large outbreak situations, control strategies did become resource-constrained, illustrat-506
ing the impact of spatial scales of resource availability. Had the estimated disposal capacities507
been aggregated as a pooled national scale resource, capacity would have been su cient for508
large outbreaks. However, restricting animal disposal to within the same state produced a509
very di↵erent outcome. Because certain regions were impacted much more heavily in large510
outbreaks, they quickly reached their disposal capacity, at which point culling was no longer511
possible. Capturing the appropriate spatial scale of control resource availability is therefore512
critical when anticipating di↵erent regional outcomes.513
Control scenarios exhibited the same bi-modal behaviours as the base scenario, in which514
most seeded infections died out before spreading beyond the initially infected premises.515
This aspect of disease spread was una↵ected by reporting and control, because based on516
the reporting and latency parameters, reporting occurred several days after the premises517
became infectious. On the other hand, when infection did spread to multiple premises in518
large outbreaks, the lag in reporting time meant that control targets generally trailed behind519
disease spread. The limited control resources that were then applied were too little and too520
late to consistently prevent large outbreaks. Reporting time is therefore another parameter521
that impacts the outcomes of control actions. Exploring options for reducing this reporting522
lag could improve the overall e↵ectiveness of any control actions used.523
Targeting dangerous contacts rather than non-specifically vaccinating or culling all premises524
within a given radius takes advantage of any knowledge about which premises may be at525
higher risk than others, prioritising those premises for limited resources. Of course, the526
actual benefits of targeting dangerous contacts depends on how accurately they can be iden-527
tified. Dangerous contacts in previous outbreaks have sometimes been found to be already528
infected when identified [3, 43], potentially wasting resources for preventing infection. The529
trade-o↵s in focusing on identifying dangerous contacts would be better explored using mod-530
els that more explicitly focus on the mechanisms of identifying dangerous contacts, and the531
associated costs of control alternatives.532
4.1. Conclusions533
Ultimately, the predictions that any model produces are highly dependent on the quality534
of information available for its inputs. While using as much data as possible is the ideal, in535
reality data availability and collection can be a significant challenge, especially when scaling536
finer spatial patterns up to larger scales, or when simulating events for which there is no537
historical record. Additionally, control resource availability and plans can change, which are538
also inputs to the model. This variability across multiple inputs is where sensitivity analyses539
provide valuable information in identifying which inputs have the strongest e↵ect on outputs.540
Our findings suggest that premises-level information is important in the form of premises541
clustering and size. For county-level information, shipment activity and premises density542
is most informative. Prioritising limited resources around data quality of these attributes,543
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and the management of those attributes, if applicable, could provide more value for less544
e↵ort than prioritising all inputs and parameters equally. Together these results point to545
the importance of understanding the spatial scales of disease transmission and control, and546
how these interact with the demographic characteristics of a population. This finding can547
be used to inform modelling studies in other countries that have not had recent outbreaks,548
and potentially in other disease systems that occur in spatially heterogeneous populations.549
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Figure 1: Disease transmission sensitivity analysis of selected parameters and attributes of premises and
counties of initial infections with minimum population size estimates (see Figure S5 for results for all param-
eters and attributes used in sensitivity analysis). The proportional e↵ect (x-axis) were estimated as linear
model coe cients for number of infected premises, number of infected counties, and duration and as binomial
general linear model coe cients for the probability of outbreak fade-out and take-o↵. Infrastructure-related
attributes are shown in shades of blue, model parameters in shades of orange, and interactions between
infrastructure-related attributes and model parameters in shades of green.
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(a) IP & DC cull scenario
(b) IP cull & DC vaccination scenario
Figure 2: Control sensitivity analysis for (a) IP & DC cull scenario and (b) IP cull & DC vaccination
scenario of selected parameters and attributes of premises and counties of initial infections with minimum
population size estimates (see Figures S6 & S7 for results for all parameters and attributes used in sensitivity
analysis). The proportional e↵ect (x-axis) were estimated as linear model coe cients for number of infected
premises, number of infected counties, and duration and as binomial general linear model coe cients for the
probability of outbreak fade-out and take-o↵. Infrastructure-related attributes are shown in shades of blue,
and model parameters in shades of orange.
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(a) Total annual in-shipments (b) Premises clustering
(c) Total annual out-shipments (d) Premises density
(e) Count of premises >1000 cattle
Figure 3: Relative county measures of (a) total annual in-shipments received, (b) degree of premises cluster-
ing, (c) total annual out-shipments sent, and (d) degree of premises density, and (e) the count of premises
with >1000 animals. Counties are shaded from light to dark representing, low to high bin levels (a-d) or num-
bers (e) of the attribute. (a-d) Show county attributes and bins used in county selection for the sensitivity
analyses.
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(a) Base scenario
(b) IP cull scenario (c) IP cull & 10km vaccination scenario
Figure 4: Counties coloured by proportion of transmission due to non-shipment mechanisms for (a) base
scenario (b) IP cull scenario with a 75% e↵ective shipment ban, and (c) IP cull and 10km ring vaccination
scenario with a 90% e↵ective shipment ban (all with maximum population size)
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Figure 5: Frequencies of total infected premises per simulation for maximum population size, grouped by
scenario conditions. Because the bulk of the frequencies are at 1, the high end of the x-axis is scaled up
for visibility. Colours correspond with those in Figure 6 for the base scenario to show associated geographic
distributions.
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(a) Median total infected premises
(b) Upper 97.5% total infected premises
Figure 6: (a) The median and (b) upper 97.5% percentile total infected premises under base scenario with
maximum population size. Counties are coloured by the outcomes when infection is seeded in that county.
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